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A Position on the
Control of Obscenity
By JOHN CORNELIus LEvY*
The position on the control of obscenity which this article
will sketch is as follows:
1) Obscene publications exert a substantial adverse effect on
public morality and must, therefore, be controlled-either legally
by the state, or extra-legally but not illegally by private agencies
of society.
2) Legal control by the state is, and can reasonably be, only
minimal.
3) For that very reason, extra-legal control by private agencies
of society which are non-officiously concerned with the public
welfare and which themselves act only within the law is necessary for the common good.
Obviously, many citizens disagree with this position. One of
the most responsible groups which disagrees is the American Civil
Liberties Union. As I understand its position, ACLU completely disagrees with my first proposition as to the necessity of
control for two reasons: a) there is no workable, accepted definition of obscene publications; and b) even if there were, there
1 In 1956, the late Samuel Cardinal Stritch asked the writer to enlist, and to
serve as chairman of, a small group of Chicago lawyers to undertake and main-

tam a continuing study of the laws relating to obscenity. The group is still functioning with about half of the original personnel still active. There is not, and
never was, any relationship between the group and the Archdiocese of Chicago;
the lawyers have volunteered their services from a conviction of the social significance of their work.
In addition, since 1958, the writer has been a legal consultant to the National Office for Decent Literature, a service office established by the Catholic
Bishops of the United States to offer to those who request it information respecting periodicals and paperbacks which are readily accessible to youth. On the
basis of a careful screening by qualified volunteer personnel, the Office makes
available a printed list of such publications, some of which it approves for youth,
and some of which it deems objectionable for youth on the basis of. its ninepoint published code of decency.
These statements are made at the outset of tis article to acquaint the reader
with the experience, on the basis of which the writer has formulated the position
on the control of obscenity which the article will sketch.
0 Dean of the School of Law, Loyola Umversity.
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is no sufficient evidence that such publications exert any adverse
effect on the public welfare. Hence, AGLU, while agreeing
with my second statement as far as it goes, really insists that,
since all publications, including obscene publications, are with2
in the protection of the first amendment (the Roth-Alberts
decision to the contrary notwithstanding), there should be no
legal control whatever save for the possible case within the "clear
and present danger" doctrine. And, while disagreeing with my
third proposition as to the necessity for private control, ACLU
agrees that private agencies have the civil right to work for control of obscene publications so long as such agencies stay within
the law in their efforts, but it disagrees as to the legality and
prudence of certain specific means (e.g., boycotts) allegedly avail3
able to such agencies in such efforts.
This article will explore these competing positions.
IA
Can obscene publications be reasonably defined and identified? The United States Supreme Court thinks so. After a fiveyear search for an adjective of fifth and fourteenth amendment
constitutional definiteness, the Court found that the single,
simple adjective "obscene," as defined and fleshed out with workable standards by American case law, filled the bill. Speaking
through Mr. Justice Brennan in the combined cases of Roth
v. United States and Alberts v. California,4 the Court said that
"obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest." In a footnote appears the Model
Penal Code's definition of "prurient interest" as a "shameful
or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion."
By way of supplying standards to flesh out the definition,
the Court said that the american cases established that the test
of obscenity is whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
questioned material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest. In the later case of Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,5
involving the alleged obscenity of magazines intended for male
2354

U.S. 476 (1957).

3 ACLU Policy Statement on Censorship, 1962.

4354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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homosexuals, the Court added that, especially when the dominant prurient appeal was limited to a particular group in the
community, there must be in addition the element of patent
offensiveness to current community standards of decency, i.e.,
the basic indecency of the material for the community as a
whole must be self-demonstrating. Moreover, since the issue arose
under the federal postal statutes, the community involved was
the nation as a whole. And in the interim case of Smith v California6 (a state criminal proceeding), as well as in the Manual
Enterprises case (a federal non-criminal proceeding), the Court
held that, as an essential element of guilt, the defendant must
be proved to have had scienter, i.e., to have known (or to be
reasonably chargeable with having known), not that the contents
of the publication were obscene, but simply what those contents
were.
The three cases, taken together, establish that the test of
illegal obscenity for the whole community is whether, to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the questioned material (the contents of
which the defendant either knows or is reasonably chargeable
with having known), taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest, and, especially when the prurient appeal is limited to a
particular group in the community, is also patently offensive
to the contemporary standards of the relevant community as a
whole.
While this definition is still no doubt subject to further
refinement (as, for example, in the matter of what constitutes
the relevant community, and in the matter of the evidence admissible to establish the contemporary standards of the relevant
community), and while there will be marginal cases wherein its
application will be difficult, the writer submits that the Supreme
Court's definition, complete with standards, is at least adequate
as a basis for legal control.
The reader will also recall the significance of the Supreme
Court's holding in the Roth-Alberts cases that the obscene publication, as thus defined, is not within the protection of the first
amendment. That significance is this: Were obscene publications so protected, there would be but one way to justify their
6861 U.S. 147 (1959).
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legal control, and that would be by proving that they were causing a "clear and present danger" to the common good. But proof
of "presentness" is seldom possible, because the "dear danger"
to the common good from obscene publications lies in their
long-run erosion of the public morals upon which the public
welfare rests. Since, however, obscene publications are not within the protection of the first amendment, no such proof of "presentness" need be made in order to justify their legal control.
A principal effort of ACLU is to sublimate this holding and
directly or indirectly to require the "dear and present danger"
7
test as a basis for any legal control of obscenity.
Still open is the issue of whether the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity can be adjusted to a particular "target audience" if the illegality involved is similarly restricted to the
furnishing of the publications to that target audience only,
rather than to the community at large. For example, if the act
proscribed by a particular statute were the furnishing of male
homosexual magazines to male homosexuals only, rather than
to the community at large, it would seem that the factor of
patent offensiveness to the contemporary standards of the relevant community as a whole would no longer be essential; the
dominant prurient appeal to the target audience alone would
suffice to sustain the proscription of furnishing such publications
to that audience only To put the matter another way, the test
of dominant prurient appeal is to be made, not by reference
to the average adult in the community, but by reference to the
average male homosexual in the community when the proscribed
act is the furnishing of such publications to male homosexuals
only. This illustration is not particularly persuasive because
the furnisher would, of course, have to know, or be reasonably
chargeable with knowledge, that the person to whom he was
furnishing such publications was a male homosexual.
But the significance of this suggestion lies in its applicability
to youth. If the target audience is youth, why would not the
dominant prurient appeal to an average seventeen-year-old member of the community be an appropriate standard by which to
judge the obscenity of the publication for its intended audience
under a statute which would proscribe merely the furnishing of
7

ACLU Policy Statement on Censorship, 1962.
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such publications to youth.3 Indeed, if the proscription is thus
restricted, why would not the same standard be appropriate for
any publication, whether primarily intended for youth or not?
A Chicago municipal ordinance,9 which is currently being litigated, has done just that, and a similar proposed Illinois statute
is now before the Illinois legislature for enactment. 10
IB
Is there any sufficient evidence that obscene publications, as
defined, adversely affect public morality and the common good?
The best evidence is the unanimous judgment of American state
legislatures expressed by enacting public controls for obscene
publications, plus the judgment of the Federal Congress similarly
expressed from 1842 to date, plus the International Agreement
for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications,
to which over fifty nations are signatories. As the United States
Supreme Court said in the Roth-Alberts decision, these legislative judgments represent a really universal agreement that obscene publications should be restrained as inimical to the common good and destructive of public morality. This is the best
evidence both because of the universality of the legislative judgment and because, in an area of conflicting opinion (which even
ACLU concedes this area to be), it is the function of the legislature, and of the legislature only, to determine public policy.
The executive departments of governments are equally firm
in their judgment that obscene publications have a substantial
adverse effect on the common good. Police and prosecuting officials have no doubt about the matter.
The judicial departments of governments have not dissented
from this judgment, and they understand quite well that, in such
an area as this, it is not their function to dissent. But what
very many of them have done is to find, under the state and federal constitutions and in respect of particular statutes, a superior
value inextricably interwoven with the public value of suppresssing obscene publications, and they cannot permit governments
to achieve the inferior value at the expense of the superior value.
SThe restricted proscription would avoid the constitutional defect which
invalidated a Michigan statute in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
9 §192-10.1, Mumcpal Code of Chicago.
10H.B. 1072, 73rd Illinois General Assembly (1963).
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What the judicial departments have really done is to return the
whole ball of twine to the legislatures for unravelling by more
carefully drafted statutes. Have the legislatures given up? They
have not (as witness the wholesale re-enactment of obscenity
statutes after the decision in Smith v. California), and their action is further best evidence of the strength of their judgment
that obscene publications must be controlled by government m
the public interest-a judgment which they have the primary
right and duty to formulate.
In a few cases, even the United States Supreme Court has
agreed, not only with the legislative judgment as to the public
value of governmental suppression of obscene publications, but
even that the usual superior value is either not involved or not
significantly impaired: on the substantive side, that is the meanmg of the Roth-Alberts decision; and on the adjective or methods
side, that is the meaning of the decisions in Kingsley Books, Inc. v
Brown" and Times Film Corp. v. City of Chzcago'2-and that is
still the meaning of those cases, despite their subsequent qualification by later decisions.
The conclusion is that the best evidence of the substantial
adverse effect of obscene publications on the public welfare is
the unanimous legislative judgments to that effect. Let those
who contest that really universal judgment assume the burden
of proof.
Moving behind the really universal legislative judgment, only
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black have ever even questioned the adequacy of the basis for it-and even they have done
so only in the course of maintaining that the superior value of
free expression is both always involved and moreover an absolute
value in and of itself. Their comments disclose that they, along
with ACLU, recognize a conflict of underlying evidence on the
matter. That conflict exists in the area of opinion evidence. So
they resolve the determination of public policy in this matter
by deprecating the probative value of opinion evidence and by
demanding that the legislatures support the legislative judgment
by experimental and scientific evidence alone. Ignoring the primacy of the legislature in the determination of public policy
11354 U.S. 436 (1957).
12865 U.S. 43 (1961).
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on any but a completely arbitrary basis, and ignoring the attempt to switch the burden of proof, they postulate the necessity for this type of evidence, and this type alone, to support
the legislative judgment, well aware that neither side has such
evidence at its command.
The writer protests this effort to deny the probative value
of opinion evidence, especially in the absence of the experimental
evidence which the Justices demand. The probative value of
opinion evidence, especially in the absence of experimental evidence, is always and properly relied on. The fact is that there
is a universal judgment by ordinary men and women that there
is a relationship between the dissemination of obscene publications and the positing of antisocial conduct and between such
dissemination and the long-run erosion of public morals upon
which the public welfare rests. This is the general experience of
mankind and the common sense of the matter. In addition, men
and women who have had greater occasion to observe than others
generally concur in this judgment. For example, parents concur
(1957 Trendex News Service Poll), psychologists and psychiatrists concur (e.g., Dr. Benjamin Karpman, chief psychotherapist at St. Elizabeth s Hospital in Washington D.C., Dr. Frederic Wertham, author of The Seduction of the Innocent; Dr.
Ralph S. Banay, former research psychiatrist at Columbia University; Dr. George W Henry, professor of clinical psychiatry
at Cornell University; Dr. Nicholas G. Frignito of Philadelphia),
sociologists concur (e.g., Dr. Pitirim Sorokin, professor of sociology at Harvard University and author of The American Sex
Revolution), juvenile judges concur (e.g., The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges), enforcement officials concur (e.g.,
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, and The National Association of County
and Prosecuting Attorneys) post-office and customs officials concur; clerics and religious counselors of all faiths concur. These
concurrences are collected in testimony presented to the Gathings,
Kefauver, and Granahan congressional committees, and in the
Annual Reports of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee Studying the Publication and Dissemination of Obscene
and Offensive Materials.
It will occur to someone to remind the writer that there was
a time when there was a universal concurrence of opinion that
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the earth was flat. Hence, this universal concurrence of opinion
that obscene publications have a substantial adverse effect on the
public welfare may be equally erroneous. The writer has two
observations to make in this respect: (a) Those who contended
that the earth was round accepted the burden of proof; and (b)
that there can be universal ignorance of a physical fact is not
surprising; on the other hand, universal ignorance of a social
and moral fact would indeed be surprising in view of the essential nature of man as a social and moral being.
In conclusion, when the writer says that there is a universal
agreement that obscene publications have a substantial adverse
effect on the public welfare, what is the thrust of that observation? It is this: our American democratic way of life is based on
public ideals of family integrity, parental authority, parental
responsibility for the education of children, the institution of
marriage as the basis for the family, and non-deviate sexual
relations. It is these basic social and public institutions and practices which are eroded in the long run by obscene publications,
which now constitute a mass media of communication, and which
glorify and normalize sex perversions, disrespect for authority,
ridicule for marital fidelity, and the fatuous notion that sex
can be and is an end in itself. Listen to Dr. Sorokin in The
American Sex Revolution:
The sham literature of our age is designed for the commercial cultivation, propagation and exploitation of the
The world of this
most degraded forms of behavior.
popular literature is a sort of human zoo, inhabited by
raped, mutilated and murdered females and [by] hemales outmatching m bestiality any caveman and outAnd what is especially
lusting the lusting animals.
symptomatic is that many of these human animals are made
to luxuriate in this way of life. 13
II
The area for legal control of obscenity is, and reasonably can
be, but minimal.
(a) That it is but minimal is clear from a survey of the
principal United States Supreme Court decisions of the past
decade. The writer has already published such a survey.i 4 The
i3 Sorokm, The Amencan Sex Revolution 24 (1956).
14

8 The Catholic Lawyer 93-109 (1962).
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1963 case of Bantam Books v. Sullivan1 5 merely confirms that
conclusion, and the writer does not expect the two pending cases
of Ohio v. Jacobellisl6 and Smzth v Californza 7 to upset that
conclusion. Either on substantative or on objective grounds, all
United States Supreme Court decisions of the past decade have
been adverse to the legal control of obscenity except three: The
Roth-Alberts decision,18 which established a constitutionally adequate definition of obscenity, plus the proposition that the
obscene, as thus defined, did not enjoy the protection of the first
amendment; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 9 which established
the over-all constitutionality of the New York injunction method
of control; and Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,20 which
established the basic constitutionality of a municipal licensing
system for the public exhibition of motion picture films. While
it is true that each of these cases has already been restrictively
refined by subsequent decisions either of the United States Supreme Court or of other courts, these three decisions still warrant the conclusion that there is today under the United States
Constitution some legal protection against obscenity, but not
very much.
(b) This narrow scope of legal control may well be all that
can reasonably be expected of the law Personal freedoms, which
are the key values in our society and which are carefully protected by the first amendment, are more secure from governmental interference; and the controls of community pressure,
exerted through private citizens' groups acting extra-legally but
not illegally, still remain available.
In this context the 1957 Annual Statement of the American
Catholic Hierarchy on Censorship 2 1 stands as a statement truly
remarkable for its clarity, its moderation, and its perception.
The statement pointed out that any governmental censorship
necessarily impinges on the individual's freedom to communicate
15 83 Sup. Ct. 631 (1963).

16 Ohio v. Jacobellis, appeal granted, 31 U.S.L. Week 3107 (U.S. Oct. 8,
1962). The case was argued March 26, 1963, but has been scheduled for
re-argument, 31 U.S.L. Week 3353, immediately after Smith v. California, No.
812, Sup. Ct., cert granted,31 U.S.L. Week 3351 (U.S. 1963).
17 Supra note 16.
183 54 U.S. 476 (1957).
19354 U.S. 436 (1957).
203 65 U.S. 43 (1961).
2156 Catholic Mind 180 (1958).
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(which stems from his basic right to know), and that this freedom is absolutely essential to the development not only of the
individual but of the democratic state. This freedom to communicate, of course, has obvious social implications, which require that the freedom be exercised within the limitations imposed by the equal freedom of others in society and by the general welfare. It is inevitable, however, that legal restraints on
individual freedoms can be but minimal; civil law will define
any limitation on freedom as narrowly as possible, and the limitation must clearly be necessary for the common good. The
American legal system has always been dedicated to the principle
of minimal restraint-to curb less rather than more, to hold for
liberty rather than for restraint. Thus do we best safeguard our
basic freedoms. It follows that, owing to the exigencies of free
speech and free press, a communication may not be legally punishable, but may yet defy the moral standards of the great majority of the community. Between the legally punishable and
the morally evil, there is a great gap. To accept as morally inoffensive all that is legally unpunishable would be to lower greatly
our moral standards. Civil legislation of itself is not an adequate
standard of morality It is for this reason that we need private
agencies to evaluate communications on the basis of moral standards higher than those practicable for civil law, and then to
publicize their evaluations and to seek by legal means the cooperation of like-minded persons in the vindication of their rights
as parents and citizens. The right, by legal means, to speak out
for good morals is not challengeable in our democracy.
The conclusion, then, is that governmental protection of
community standards of decency can reasonably be but minimal,
because freedom of expression is normally a superior public
value and governments cannot be permitted to sacrifice the
superior value for the inferior, even though the inferior is also
a public value.
III
But the private citizen is not legally restricted to the same
extent as is his government. He and his fellow citizens have made
the judgment that obscene publications subvert the public welfare. As private citizens, they are constitutionally free to implement that judgment, provided that their implementing action

A PosImoN ON THE CONTROL OF OBscENrrY

is itself within the law. And that judgment, be it noted, is in
the area of public (not private) morality. They are acting, not
because the obscene publications offend their private or personal
moral codes or constitute occasions of sin, but because those
publications adversely affect the public welfare.
Their right to make that judgment and their right, within
the law, to implement that judgment are really aspects of their
own basic constitutional right of freedom of expression. It is
for that reason that the writer expects organizations such as ACLU,
not only not to contest, but in fact to support, the right to judge
and to act non-governmentally in this area. The writer is happy
to acknowledge that ACLU has done so in its latest policy statement. And, as far as he knows, ACLU did not subscribe to the
1953 Westchester Statement of the American Library Association and the American Book Publishers Council that any approach other than that of governmental control was improper.
While, therefore, ACLU does not agree that there is any necessity
for private contral of obscenity, it does agree that private agencies
have the civil right to work for such control so long as such
22
agencies stay within the law in their efforts.
The area of disagreement here is whether certain specific
methods of control ought to be used by private agencies. ACLU,
for example, concedes the legality of specific primary boycotts,
but opposes both general and secondary boycotts owing to their
wider impact on the circulation of ideas and owing to their
stronger coercive effect. It is not clear to the writer whether
ACLU opposes general and secondary boycotts as illegal, or
merely opposes them as unwise. While common law case authority is scant, the writer submits that it supports the legality
of general and secondary boycotts where they are justified either
by a lawful purpose or by a special relationship between the
person or organization urging the boycott and the third-party
members of the community sought to be induced, and where no
unlawful means (such as misrepresentation, fraud, threats of criminal prosecution, or inducing breach of contract) are used.
To move into this area of the means by which an individual
or a private group may legally implement the judgment that obscene publications adversely affect the public welfare of the
22 ACLU Policy Statement on Censorship, 1962.
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relevant community, the writer submits that:
a) The individual citizen-customer may lawfully formulate
that judgment and may lawfully implement it by making his
views known to dealers, distributors, and publishers, and by persuading them to recognize their responsibility for the public
welfare, and by himself refusing to buy anything from them if
they do not, and even by himself refusing to buy anything from
23
their suppliers and advertisers.
b) The individual dealer, distributor, or publisher has no
legal duty to publish, distribute, or retail any particular publication, even though his refusal to do so may impair the access of
others to that publication. He is free to handle the item or not.
He may decide not to handle the item for any of a variety of
reasons, e.g., recognition of community responsibility, fear of
community criticism, the fact that the item offends his private
moral code, or the fact that handling the item may be economically unprofitable.
c) The individual citizen-customer may join with other citizencustomers of like mind in a civic or a religious group for a group
judgment and group persuasion. For the guidance of its members and for the information of the community, the group may
publish and distribute a list of publications which it deems
subversive of the public welfare. Even the Executive Director of
the American Book Publishers Council now concedes the propriety of such a list. Moreover, the group may be justified m
undertaking a concerted refusal to deal in business with those who
persist in ignoring the group judgment, where such action does
not involve a breach of contract and where no other illegal
24
means are involved.
d) Only when the group seeks the participation of non-member
citizens in the community in its refusal to deal in business with
those who ignore its judgment, does a boycott exist. As noted,
ACLU agrees that a specific primary boycott is legal but opposes
both general primary boycotts and secondary boycotts; again,
as noted, it is not clear whether it opposes such boycotts as illegal
or merely as unwise. If the latter, it is worth noticing that, as a
23

Restatement, Torts §762. For the purposes of this position sketch, the

writer is content to cite merely tins secondary source, because he is not aware
of any difference of opinion in respect of the text statements of the section.
24 Restatement, Torts §765 (see note 21 supra).
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matter of policy, the National Office for Decent Literature also
prohibits any use of its list of objectionable books in boycott
actions.
Prescinding from the wisdom of employing such methods, the
writer submits merely that such boycotts are legal where justified by a privilege so to act2 5 and where such action does not
constitute or induce a breach of contract or involve any other
illegal means. 2 6 The essence of the privilege appears to be a nonofficious and good faith responsibility for the welfare of the
third persons in the community who are induced to refuse to
deal in business with the alleged offender. This responsibility
is often evidenced by a relationship which exists between the inducer and the persons whom he seeks so to induce, for example,
a clergyman in respect of his congregation; an educator in respect
of his students. The privileged person must believe that the welfare of his charges is threatened by the business relationship
with which he seeks to interfere and must in good faith direct
27
his interference to the protection of the welfare of his charges.
Whether this statute is essentzal to the existence of the privilege
or whether a simple lawful purpose without the status might
suffice to establish the privilege, is not clear. It zs clear that the
purpose of the influencer is one factor in assessing the legality of
boycotts, because the prima facie tort of intentional interference
with reasonable business expectations may be justified by a lawful
28
purpose where no other unlawful means are used.
Some cases establishing the status-based privilege follow
In Kuryer Publishng Co. v. Messler,2 9 Roman Catholic Bishops
ordered their congregation not to buy, possess, or read a secular
newspaper, and their action was held not to be tortious. In Watch
Tower Bible and Tract Soc'y. v. Dougherty,s0 Roman Catholic
Bishops induced their congregation to threaten not to patronize
a department store unless the store, which owned and operated
a radio station, used its influence to cause the Watch Tower So2

2

5 Restatement, Torts §766 (see note 21 supra).
6

27

Restatement, Torts §767 (see note 21 supra).

Restatement, Torts §770. The cases are cited m the following footnotes.
Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 705 (1962). While the purpose for which Professor Coons treats the cases
differs from the writers purpose, Professor Coons article is the finest analysis
of the cases, of which the writer knows.
29 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W 948 (1916).
80337 Pa. 286, 11 A. 2d 147 (1940).
28
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ciety to cease broadcasting attacks on the Catholic Church over
the radio station. As a driect result of this action of the Bishops,
the department store refused to renew a broadcasting contract
with the Society. The action of the Bishops was held not to be
tortious. That laymen may enjoy the same privilege as the
Bishops was held in Rosman v. United Strictly Kosher Butchers.81
In Gott v. Berea College32 and in Jones v. Cody,33 educators who
ordered or induced their students not to deal in business with
the respective plaintiffs were held to be privileged. In Hutton v
Watters84 however, the educator was not privileged because the
court discerned a self-interest in his action, rather than a genuine
concern for the welfare of his students. In dictum in Gott v.
Berea College, 5 the court also thought that a parent would be
privileged in respect of his minor children.
Cases in which the influencer had no normally privileged relationship with those sought to be influenced, and where, therefore, the alleged privilege was based solely on a lawful purpose,
are not clear as to the sufficiency of lawful purpose alone. Where
the purpose for a Negro boycott of white businessmen was primarily a racial purpose directed against alleged discriminatory
8 held that
hiring practices, A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson"
3
such a purpose would not suffice, whereas Green v Samuelson, T
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. 33 and Hughes v.
Superior Court39 contained dictum that that purpose could make
the boycott privileged. In Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond,40 an
economic purpose was held sufficient to make the boycott privileged. And in American Mercury, Inc. v. Chase,41 the purpose
of a non-officious concern for the public welfare might have
sufficed, had not illegal means (in the form of threats of criminal prosecution) been used.
The "status cases" may be compared with the "lawful purpose
cases" by means of the following hypothetical. In the status8i

164 Misc. 378, 298 N.Y. Supp. 343 (1937).

32 156 Ky. 876, 161 S.W 204 (1913).
33 132 Mich. 13, 92 N.W 495 (1902).
34 182 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W 184 (1915).

35 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W 204 (1913).
86 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (1934).
87 168 Md. 421, 178 Ad. 109 (1935).
3892 F 2d 510 (1937), revd on other grounds, 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
89 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198, P. 2d 885 (1948).
40152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y. Supp. 250 (1934).
4113 F 2d 224 (1926).
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based privilege cases (in which, as noted, the case authority is
consistent for the privilege making the boycott legal, in the
absence of inducement to breach of contract and of any other
illegal means), the individual or individuals inducing the boycott directed the appeal to the persons for whose welfare he or
they sustained a non-officious responsibility. Were the appeal
to be extended to a broader group in the community (as, for example, were the educator to induce the entire community to cease
business dealings with a merchant whose practices threatened
the student welfare for which the educator was non-officiously
responsible), the "status cases" would not appear to be in point.
The purpose, however, would appear still to be lawful, and the
"lawful purpose cases" might yet sustain the privilege.
It should also be noted that almost all the cases establishing
the privilege to boycott involve general primary boycotts. Only
the Watch Tower case involves a secondary boycott. The Watch
Tower Society was the offender, but the general boycott was directed, not against it, but against its licensor-and against that
licensor, not in its capacity as operator of a radio station, but in
its capacity as operator of a department store.
It is submitted that the boycott, whether specific or general
and whether primary or secondary, has been sustained as a legal
method of private control where it does not involve inducing a
breach of contract or the use of any other illegal means (such as
fraud, misrepresentation, threats of criminal prosecution) -certainly where the individual or individuals inducing the boycott
are directing their inducement to those for whose welfare they
sustain a non-officious responsibility, and less certainly where the
boycott has at least a lawful purpose.
In any event, private individuals and groups, free from the
constitutional restrictions which narrowly confine the efforts of
their governments to control obscene publications, may lawfully
pursue their own extra-legal efforts to do so, so long as they
remain themselves within the law in those efforts; and, under
existing law, a broad range of permissible activity is open to them.

